University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Informatics - Papers (Archive)

Faculty of Engineering and Information
Sciences

December 2003

Forensic Computing
X. Li
University of Wollongong

Jennifer Seberry
University of Wollongong, jennie@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers
Part of the Physical Sciences and Mathematics Commons

Recommended Citation
Li, X. and Seberry, Jennifer: Forensic Computing 2003.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/287

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Forensic Computing
Abstract
Technology is rapidly changing the speed and manner in which people interact with each other and with
the world. As technology helps criminals to operate more easily and quickly across borders, so law
enforcement capability must continuously improve to keep one step ahead. Computer forensics has
become a specialized and accepted investigative technique with its own tools and legal precedents that
validate the discipline. Specially designed forensic software is also widely used during the whole process
of computer forensic investigation. This article introduces computer forensic and computer evidence,
introduces and compares some forensic software, and summarizes its likely future development.

Disciplines
Physical Sciences and Mathematics

Publication Details
This article was originally published as Li, X and Seberry, J, Forensic Computing, in Proceedings of
INDOCRYPT'03, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2904, 2003, 18-35. Original Springer-Verlag journal
available here.

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/287

Forensi Computing
Xiang Li and Jennifer Seberry



Abstra t
Te hnology is rapidly
and with the world.

hanging the speed and manner in whi h people intera t with ea h other

As te hnology helps

ders, so law enfor ement

apability must

forensi s has be ome a spe ialized and a

riminals to operate more easily and qui kly a ross borontinuously improve to keep one step ahead.

pre edents that validate the dis ipline. Spe ially designed forensi
the whole pro ess of

omputer forensi

omputer eviden e, introdu es and

Computer

epted investigative te hnique with its own tools and legal

investigation.

software is also widely used during

This arti le introdu es

ompares some forensi

omputer forensi

and

software, and summarizes its likely future

development.

1

Ba kground

1.1 Computer forensi s de ned
Computer forensi s or forensi omputing has be ome a popular topi in omputer se urity ir les and
in the legal ommunity. So what is omputer forensi s?
Dorothy A. Lunn's (Dorothy) de nition of omputer forensi s is, \The employment of a set of prede ned pro edures to thoroughly examine a omputer system using software and tools to extra t and
preserve eviden e of riminal a tivity." Judd Robbins (Judd), a omputer forensi s investigator, de nes
omputer forensi s as \Simply the appli ation of omputer investigation and analysis te hniques in the
interest of determining potential legal eviden e." James Bor k (James), in his arti le \Leave the ybersleuthing to the experts". De nes Computer forensi s as \the equivalent of surveying a rime s ene or
performing an autopsy on a vi tim".
From these des riptions, we an see omputer forensi s an be de ned as the appli ation of omputer
investigation and analysis te hniques in the interests of determining potential eviden e. It deals with the
appli ation of law to a s ien e and it involves the use of sophisti ated te hnology tools and pro edures
that must be followed to guarantee the a ura y of the preservation of eviden e and the a ura y of
results on erning omputer eviden e pro essing.

1.2 Requirements for omputer forensi s
Nowadays more and more riminals have been shifting their attention from armed robbery to omputer
rime. Criminals may use omputers in one of two ways in support of their a tions. Either as the
repository for information relating to their riminal a tivity, whi h is alled omputer related rime, or
as a tool in a tually ommitting a rime, this is so alled omputer rime. For them, a omputer is
mu h more powerful than a knife or a gun. More seriously, the probability of being aught on their
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a tions is very low. For example, a ha ker an break into a bank's online transa tion system and steal
$250,000 without being aught or harged for la k of enough eviden e even if he is aught. The fa t is
that the riminals are no longer stupid and always easily aught as in the show on TV or in the movies.
Many modern riminals are trying to use omputers and other modern te hnologies to realize their rimes
without being dis overed, this is so alled high te h rime. Therefore, the needs for professionals apable
of performing ele troni investigations that an produ e the ne essary eviden e to onvi t have in reased.
Another requirement for omputer forensi s is be ause of the vast number of do uments now exist
in ele troni form. Years ago, most eviden e olle ted was on paper. Today, the majority of eviden e
resides on a omputer this makes it fragile by its very nature. No investigation involving the review
of do uments, either in a riminal or orporate setting, is omplete without in luding properly handled
omputer eviden e. Additionally, omputer forensi s ensures the preservation and authenti ation of
omputer data and greatly fa ilitates the re overy and analysis of deleted les and many other forms of
ompelling information normally invisible to the user.
On the other hand, the basi nature of Internet te hnology o ers riminals many ways to hide their
tra ks and disguise their rimes. Computer rimes are borderless; the rime an be ommitted over a
modem from next door or from ten thousand miles away, with equally e e tive out omes. However, at
the same time, te hnology provides many lues as to the nature of the rime, how it was ommitted, and
who was behind it. In omputer forensi s, things are not always as they seem. The riminals tend to stay
a few steps ahead of law enfor ement, and often ome up with the most inventive means of prote ting
themselves and destroying eviden e. It is the job of the omputer forensi s expert to work with law
enfor ement to preserve eviden e, re onstru t rimes, and ensure that the eviden e olle ted is usable
in ourt. Only after extensive analysis is there any hope of nding out who is responsible for omputer
rimes.

1.3 Computer eviden e
1.3.1 Introdu tion
Obviously, eviden e plays a signi antly important role in a riminal ase. The target of omputer forensi
investigation is to nd potential omputer eviden e that ould be used in ourt. \Computer eviden e ould
be de ned as any item that supports the riminal enterprise urrently under investigation." (Anderson)
It will in lude hardware, software, messages of transmissions, session logs, and password authorizations
or any other item that helps to de ne or establish that riminal ondu t has o urred The rst step to
any omputer related investigation is to re ognize and sear h for the eviden e spe i to that o en e
being investigated. In many instan es the type of physi al eviden e will be easily re ognizable. E-mail
threats, denial of servi e atta ks or password ha king all leaves ele troni trails that must be preserved.
Other kinds of omputer rime, su h as Internet hild pornography, ha king, and virus atta ks, may not
be as apparent and may require the forensi examination of hardware omponents as well.
Gathering eviden e in a omputing environment is not simple as opying les from the suspe ts'
omputer and printing them out for presentation, although it is really an important part of the omputer
forensi investigation. In fa t, to a ess and nd su h data we need spe ialized tools and knowledge. The
hallenging problem is to be aware of what kinds of information exist on a omputer and how to go about
gathering and preserving the original data and making erti ated opies of that eviden e. Deliberately
disguised information in the form of en rypted, misnamed or steganographi ally-hidden data will also
be explained. In ertain ases, we will be able to de rypt data that has been found en rypted and the
means to do so will be explained and sour es noted. But where an forensi investigators nd potential
omputer eviden e? The following are some hints for them.
 List of URLs re ently visited (obtained from the temporary Internet les or Web a he and History
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folders)
 E-mail messages and list of e-mail addresses stored in the suspe t's Address book; the lename

depends on the e-mail program in use for example, the .pst le for Outlook (In some ases, this
information will be stored on an e-mail server, su h as an Ex hange server)

 Word-pro essing do uments; the le extension is dependent on the program used to reate them

ommon extensions are .do , .wpd, .wps, .rtf, and .txt

 Spreadsheet do uments; the le extension is dependent on the program used to reate them exam-

ples in lude .xls. .wgl, and .wkl

 Graphi s, in the ase of hild pornography ases; the le extensions in lude .jpg, .gif, .bmp,, .tif,

and others

 Chat logs; the lename depends on the hat program
 The Windows Registry (where appli able)
 Event viewer logs
 Appli ation logs
 Print spool les

On e the extra tion of the omputer eviden e has been a omplished, prote ting the integrity of omputer eviden e be omes of paramount on ern for investigators, prose utors and those a used. Computer
eviden e is very fragile and an easily and unintentionally be altered or destroyed. Therefore, it is important that only properly trained omputer eviden e spe ialists proves omputer eviden e.

1.3.2 Rules of omputer eviden e
In Australia the Commonwealth of Australia's Eviden e A t's requirements, a list of ve rules of eviden e
that need to be followed in order for omputer eviden e to be useful to the ourt, and make them easy
to understand. Other jurisdi tions have similar laws.
 Admissiblity
This is the most basi rule: the eviden e must be able to be used in ourt or elsewhere. Failure to
omply with this rule is equivalent to not olle ting the eviden e in the rst pla e, ex ept the ost is
higher.
 Authenti ity
If an eviden e an't be tied positively to the orresponding in ident, it an't be used to prove anything.
Forensi investigators must be able to show that the eviden e relates to the in ident in a relevant way.
 Completeness
It's not enough to olle t eviden e that just shows one perspe tive of the in ident. Forensi investigators must not only olle t eviden e that an help prove the atta ker's a tions but also onsider and
evaluate all eviden e available and retain it. Similarly, it is vital to olle t eviden e that eliminates alternative suspe ts. For instan e, if you an show the atta ker was logged in at the time of the in ident,
you also need to show who else was logged in and demonstrate why you think they didn't do it.
 Reliability
The pro ess of eviden e olle ting and analysis pro edures must not ast doubt on the eviden e's
authenti ity and vera ity.
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 Believability

The eviden e being presented should be lear, easy to understand and believable by a jury. There's
no point presenting a binary dump of pro ess memory if the jury has no idea what it all means. Similarly,
if the eviden e is presented with a formatted version that an be readily understood by a jury, you must
be able to show the relationship to the original binary, otherwise there's no way for the jury to know
whether you've faked it.

1.3.3 Legal issues about omputer eviden e
This is important for omputer forensi s as often an in ident o urs whi h involves more that one jurisdi tion, and ould also involve overseas jurisdi tions. Currently an Australian investigator has to have
a working knowledge of all eight Australian Eviden e A ts and the orresponding rime legislations. A
ommon `lo al' Eviden e A t would improve the fun tionality of investigations where only one set of
domesti `rules' is required
Investigators also need to beware that what is a eptable, legal pra ti e in one jurisdi tion may be
una eptable in another, rendering the eviden e olle ted inadmissible in that jurisdi tion's law ourts.
An example where standard legislation would be bene ial is where an in ident o urs in Western
Australia in a national ompany whose head oÆ e, and internal investigators reside in NSW. The investigators, in addition to their lo al NSW A t also need to know the Western Australia A t, and the
orresponding rime legislations.
Similarly an in ident for an Australian based international ompany ould o ur in their Tokyo or
London oÆ e requiring an Australian investigator to attend the s ene and ondu t an investigation. This
is where knowledge of international eviden e handling rules is essential.

1.4 The Computer forensi pro ess
As forensi s is the re overy of eviden e through a s ienti method and methodology is the heart of any
forensi s ien e, omputer forensi s is no ex eption. A standard pro edure for olle ting, prote ting, and
examining omputer eviden e must be made and adhered to from start to nish, so as to preserve the
integrity of the eviden e. A standard omputer forensi pro ess should in lude four steps:
1. Identifying
2. Preserving
3. Analysing
4. Presenting
Identifying is the pro ess of identifying su h things as what eviden e is present, where and how it is
stored, and whi h operating system is being used. From this information the investigator an identify
the appropriate re overy methodologies, and the tools to be used.
Preserving is the pro ess of preserving the integrity of the digital eviden e, ensuring the hain of ustody is not broken. The data needs to be preserved on stable media su h as CD-ROM, using reprodu ible
methodologies. All steps taken to apture the data must be do umented. Any hanges to the eviden e
must also be do umented, in luding what the hange was and the reason for the hange. You may need
to prove the integrity of the data in a ourt of law
Analysing is the pro ess of reviewing and examining the data. The advantage of opying this data
onto CD-ROMs is the fa t that it an be viewed without risk of a idental hanges, therefore maintaining
the integrity whilst examining the eviden e.
4

Presenting is the pro ess of presenting the eviden e in a legally a eptable and understandable manner.
If the matter is presented in ourt the jury, who may have little or no omputer experien e, must all be
able to understand what is presented and how it relates to the original; otherwise all your e orts ould
be futile.
As the rst step of omputer forensi examination, Identifying plays an important role and it should
be followed as a standard pro essing. The following is a general eviden e pro essing guidelines from New
Te hnologies In . (NTICEPS):
1. Shut down the omputer; this should be done as qui kly as possible onsideration should be given
to possible destru tive pro esses that may be operating in the ba kground.
2. Do ument the hardware on guration of the omputer system being investigated and pay attention
to how the omputer is set up before it is dismantled it will need to be restored to its original
ondition at a se ure lo ation. A proper hain of ustody an be maintained and eviden e pro essing
an begin. A hain of ustody is a roadmap that shows how eviden e was olle ted, analysed, and
preserved in order to be presented as eviden e in ourt. Establishing a lear hain of ustody is
ru ial be ause ele troni eviden e an be easily altered.
3. Transport the omputer system to a se ure lo ation and don't leave the omputer unattended unless
it is lo ked up in a se ure lo ation.
4. Make a bit stream opy of hard disks and oppy disks: The ompputer should not be operated and
omputer eviden e should not be pro essed until bit stream ba kups have been made of all hard
disk drives and oppy disks. All eviden e pro essing, should be done on a restored opy of the bit
stream ba kup, not on the original omputer. During this step, spe ial designed forensi software
is strongly re ommended to use.
Preservation of omputer eviden e is vitally important be ause omputer eviden e is always fragile
and an easily be altered or destroyed. Su h alteration or destru tion of data is beyond re overy. Bit
stream ba kups are mu h like an insuran e poli y and they are essential for any serious omputer
eviden e pro essing.
5. Mathemati ally authenti ate data on all storage devi es: To be able to prove that the eviden es
haven't been hanged, all les and disks must be authenti ated. Su h proof will help you rebut
hallenge that you hanged or altered the original eviden e. Due to the improvement of today's
speed of omputers and the vast amount of storage apa ity on omputer hard disk drives, the level
of a ura y for A 32 bit CRC is no longer a urate enough. Therefore, urrently most forensi
examination tools using a 128 bit level of a ura y to mathemati ally authenti ate data.
6. Do ument the system date and time: The dates and times asso iated with omputer les an be
extremely important from an eviden e standpoint. Do ument the system data and time settings at
the time the omputer is taken into eviden e.
7. Make a list of key sear h words: There are forensi tools available to sear h for relevant eviden e.
Gathering information from individuals familiar with the ase to help ompile a list of relevant key
words is important these an be used to sear h the disk drives.
8. Evaluate the Windows swap le: The Windows swap le is a potentially valuable sour e of eviden e
and leads. The evaluation of the swap le an be automated with forensi tools. Unix system uses
either a swap le on one existing le system or an individual swap partition to store information
temporarily. So the swap le or the swap partition must be he ked for potential eviden e.
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9. Evaluate le sla k: File sla k is a data storage area of whi h most omputer users are unaware.
The data dumped from memory ends up being stored at the end of allo ated les, beyond the rea h
or view of the user. Forensi tools are required to view and evaluate le sla k and it an provide a
wealth of information and investigative leads.
10. Evaluate unallo ated spa e (erased les): The DOS and Windows 'delete' fun tion does not ompletely erase le names or le ontent. Unallo ated spa e may ontain erased les and le sla k
asso iated with the erased les. The DOS Undelete program an be used to restore the previously
erased les. However, Unix system doesn't provide any tool to dire tly re over the \deleted" les.
The solution is to nd the raw data's lo ation and modify it.
11. Sear h les, le sla k and unallo ated spa e for key words: The list of relevant key words identi ed
in the previous steps should be used to sear h all relevant omputer hard disk drives and oppy
diskettes.
12. Do ument le names, dates and times: From an eviden e standpoint, le names, reation dates,
last modi ed dates and times an be relevant. Therefore, it is important to atalog all allo ated
and 'erased' les.
13. Identify en rypted or ompressed les and graphi les that store data in binary format: As a result,
data stored in these le formats annot be identi ed by a text sear h program. Manual evaluation
of these les is required and in the ase of en rypted les, mu h work may be involved. Reviewing
the partitioning on seized hard disk drives is also important.
14. Evaluate program fun tionality: Depending on the appli ation software involved, running programs
to learn their purpose may be ne essary.
15. Do ument the ndings: It is important to do ument the nding as issues are identi ed and as
eviden e is found. It is also important to do ument the software that was used in the forensi
evaluation of the eviden e in luding the version numbers of the programs.
16. Retain opies of software used: As part of the do umentation pro ess, it is re ommended that a
opy of the software used to in luded with the output of the forensi tool involved. Often it is
ne essary to dupli ate forensi pro essing results during or before trial. Dupli ation of results an
be diÆ ult or impossible to a hieve if the software has been upgraded and the original version used
was not retained.
Following a standard eviden e investigating pro ess will help investigators nd the right information
and keep the potential eviden e reliable and believable by the ourt. However, during the investigating pro ess, good knowledge of omputer systems and legal issues an't guarantee the su ess of the
investigation; spe ially designed forensi software is another esseential weapon for forensi examiners.
2

Forensi

software

2.1 Introdu tion
The s ien e of forensi s is a highly te hni al and detailed dis ipline. The methodology of a omputer
forensi s expert is that he has a wide range of omputer hardware and software expertise. He an identify
the intrusion by knowing where to look, what to look for, and what other eviden e may be needed. Hw
should gather enough information to de ide if law enfor ement should be involved. Most important, a
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omputer forensi s expert has to possess a wide variety o skills, own or develop a suite of software
forensi s tools, and maintain the integrity of the hain o eviden e a ording to a epted legal pra ti es.
To ensure that omputer eviden e is admissible in ourt, it is best pra ti e and use of forensi software
whi h an help omputer forensi investigators. From the point of forensi investigation, forensi software
an be used through out the whole pro ess from identifying to analysing eviden e.
Generally, there are some spe i riteria for forensi investigators to hoose the right forensi software:
 It must not alter the data as a side e e t of the olle tion pro ess.
 It must olle t all of the data wanted, and only the data wanted.
 The user must be able to ensure whether the software works properly.
 It must be generally a epted by the omputer forensi investigative ommunity.
 The results produ ed must be repeatable.

2.2 Classi ation of forensi software
Depending on their fun tions and targets, forensi software an be divided into several groups.

2.2.1 Hashing fun tions
To mathemati ally reate a unique signature for the ontent of a omputer hard disk drive is very
important to keep eviden e reliable. Spe ial hashing algorithms must be used to reate the unique
identity for les and disks.
Most law enfor ement omputer forensi spe ialists rely upon mathemati al validation to verify that
the restored mirror image of a omputer disk drive and relevant les exa tly mat h the ontents of the
original omputer. Su h omparisons help resolve questions that might be raised during litigation about
the a ura y of the restored mirror image. They also a t as a means of prote tion for the omputer
forensi spe ialists on erning allegations that les were altered or planted by law enfor ement oÆ ials
during the pro essing of the omputer eviden e.
In the past 32 bit algorithms were used for this purpose and programs su h as CRCHECK and CRC32
be ame popular. More re ently it has be ome ne essary to use more a urate mathemati al al ulations
for this purpose, i.e. 128 bit hashes. The reasons are tied to the potential for brute for e atta ks using
today's powerful desktop omputers and also the volume of les that exist on ontemporary omputer
hard disk drives. It is not un ommon to nd over 100,000 les to be stored on omputer hard disk drives
today and the storage apa ity in reases ea h in few months due to advan es in te hnology.
The following is a omparison of methods to reate the unique identity for omputer les and data.

Che ksums

A method of he king for errors in digital data. Typi ally a 16- or 32-bit polynomial is applied to ea h
byte of digital data that you are trying to prote t. The result is a small integer value that is 16 or 32 bits
in length and represents the on atenation of the data. This integer value must be saved and se ured.
At any point in the future the same polynomial an be applied to the data and then ompared with the
original result. If the results mat h some level of integrity exists.
Common types:
CRC 16
CRC 32
Advantages:
1. Easy to ompute
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2. Fast Small data storage
3. Useful for dete ting random errors
Disadvantages:
1. Low assuran e against mali ious atta k
2. Simple to reate new data with mat hing he ksum
3. Must maintain se ure storage of he ksum values

One-way hash algorithm

A method for prote ting digital data against unauthorized hange. The method produ es a xed length
large integer value (ranging from 80 to 240 bits) representing the digital data. The method is said to
have one-wayness be ause it has two unique hara teristi s. First given the hash value it is diÆ ult to
onstru t new data resulting in the same hash. Se ond given the original data it is diÆ ult to nd other
data mat hing the same hash value.
Common types:
SHA-1
MD5
MD4
MD2
Advantages:
1. Easy to ompute
2. Can dete t both random errors and mali ious alterations
Disadvantages:
1. Must maintain se ure storage of hash values
2. Does not bind identity with the data
3. Does not bind time with the data

Digital Signatures

A se ure method of binding the identity of the signer with digital data integrity methods su h as one-way
hash values. These methods use a publi key ryptosystem where the signer uses a se ret key to generate
a digital signature. Anyone an then validate the signature generated by using the published publi key
erti ate of the signer. The signature produ es a large integer number (512- 4096 bits)
Common types:
RSA
DSA
PGP
Advantages:
1. Binds identity to the integrity operation
2. Prevents unauthorized regeneration of signature unless private key is ompromised
Disadvantages:
1. Slow
2. Must prote t the private key
3. Does not bind time with the data
4. If the keys are ompromised or erti ate expires digital signature an ause diÆ ullties

8
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Bit-stream fun tion

Computer eviden e is, by its nature, fragile. Some data is volatile that is, it is transient in nature and,
unlike data stored on disk, will be lost when the omputer is shut down. Data on a omputer disk an
be easily damaged, destroyed, or hanged either deliberately or a identally. The rst step in handling
su h digital eviden e is to prote t it from any sort of manipulation or a ident. The best way to do this
is to immediately make a omplete bit stream image of the media on whi h the eviden e is stored. A
bit stream image is a opy in whi h every bit is opied se tor by se tor from the original disk to the
dupli ate. It signi antly di ers to the disk ba kup we normally used. Spe ial forensi s software must
be used to undertake bit stream imaging for forensi examination.
National Institute of Standards and Te hnology (NIST) de nes Disk imaging tool top-level requirement as following:
 The tool shall make a bit-stream dupli ate or an image of an original disk or partition.
 The tool shall not alter the original disk.
 The tool shall be able to verify the integrity of a disk image le.
 The tool shall log I/O errors.
 The tool's do umentation shall be orre t.

Basi ally, a bit-stream imaging tool should not alter the original disk, must log every issue during the
imaging pro ess and notify the user if error happens. In addition, for se urity onsiderations, internal
veri ation should be made. It is used to verify the imaging pro edures and to he k if there are any
hanges during imaging pro ess. Che ksums is one of the ways to he k the validity of the opy from the
original drive. It will apply an advan ed mathemati s algorithm to the information stored on a drive or
le. The output of this mathemati s will give a unique output. This means that we an ompare the
original with the opy using the he ksum. The same he ksums between original and opy shows an
exa t opy has been produ ed. It is almost impossible and extremely diÆ ult ot hange the information
on the drive without hanging the he ksums. On the other hand, some of the disk-imaging tools use
y li al redundan y he ksums (CRC) or MD5 he ksums to ensure the integrity of the eviden e.

3.0.2

Data pro ess fun tion

Normally omputer eviden e an be easily found in spreadsheet, database or word pro essing les. On the
other hand, potential eviden e an also be found in Windows swap le, page les, le sla k or unallo ated
le spa e by using spe ial forensi tools.
In su h ir umstan es, data stored in non-traditional omputer storage areas and formats is alled
ambient data. Spe ial tools are needed to nd these ambient data for potential eviden e.
For example, many Windows appli ations reate temporary les to fa ilitate sorting fun tions, the
reation of indexes, and s rolling. Su h les an ontain fragments of the work session that generated
the reation and use of the temporary les. Most temporary les reated by Windows appli ations, e.g.,
databases and word pro essing programs, are automati ally deleted when the le and/or appli ation is
losed. As with other les erased under Windows, the data remains behind on the omputer storage
devi e. Windows also reates temporary les as a normal pro ess during the operation of the omputer.
Most temporary les reated by Windows are not deleted by the operating system.
The Unix operating system is ompletely di erent from the Windows platform. Swap spa e is a
omplimentary omposition of Unix le system. You an use either a swap le on one existing le
system or an individual swap partition to store information temporarily. Basi ally, there's no individual
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temporary les reated for appli ations. So in most ir umstan e, the Unix swap partition is an extremely
important sour e for seeking potential eviden e.

3.0.3 Windows system temporary les
Operating System: Windows 3x
Filename: 386SPART.PAR
Default Lo ation: WindowsSystem subdire tory or root dire tory of the drive designated in the virtual
memory dialog box
Operating System: Windows 9x
Filename: WIN386.SWP
Default Lo ation: Root dire tory of the drive designated in the virtual memory dialog box
Operating System: Windows NT2000XP
Filename: PAGEFILE.SYS
Default Lo ation: Root dire tory of the drive on whi h the system root dire tory (WINNT by default)
is installed

3.1 Other data re over fun tions
In some ir umstan es, omputer les are not really ompletely removed from omputer system. The
\delete" identity appears to have been used but the data is still kept. These les or data an be re overed
by spe ial tools and identi ed as potential eviden e.

3.1.1 Content sear hing fun tion
Sometimes, we need a qui kly sear h on hard disks, zip disks or oppy disks for keywords or spe i
patterns of text. Di erent forensi ase has di erent keyword. For example, in a hild pornography
investigating s ene, we an use \lolita" as keyword to sear h potential eviden e, however, it is absolutely
not the right keyword for a nan ial fraud ase

3.1.2 Password re overy fun tion
Files or data in personal omputers sometimes may be en rypted for personal purposes. Sometimes,
a ess to these les and data is required for eviden e olle tion. Cryptography te hnology will be used
for ra king the password or de rypt the en rypted omputer system. However, investigators should
onsider personal priva y issues before using this fun tion.

3.1.3 Audio and video enhan ement fun tion
Audio or video data got from surveillan e maybe hard to be examined dur to larity problems. Spe ial
tools an be used to enhan e the signals of audio or video data su h that investigators an obtain more
information from it. For example, spee h enhan ement te hnology an be used for analysing forensi
re ording on tapes.

10

4

Forensi

software produ ts

Currently there are several professional forensi software produ ts on the market. Besides the main
hashing, bit-stream imaging, and test sear hing fun tions, they also provide some other features.

4.1 Storage Media Ar hival Re overy Toolkit (SMART)
is a forensi software produ t provided by ASR Data A quisition Analysis, LLC. It is designed and
optimised to fa ilitate data forensi pra titioners and Law Enfor ement personnel.
SMART an a quire digital eviden e from a wide variety of devi es by reating a true and a urate
bit-image opy of the original, authenti ate the data it a quires using any or all of the CRC32, MD5
and SHA-1 hashing algorithms. It supports BeFS, VFAT, FAT32, HFS, HFS+,, NTFS, EXT2,EXT3,
ReiserFS and many more les systems. SMART automati ally logs an investigator's a tions, providing
a self-do umenting hain of ustody should it be required in ourt. Furthermore, SMART an generate
a omprehensive report detaining the hardware, software, on guration and ontents of a devi e or an
entire system, qui kly and easily.
The ore requirement of professional forensi software is to seek potential eviden e without hanging
anything on the eviden e storage media. To ensure the reliability of the eviden e by the law enfor ement,
SMART reates a true image of the seized eviden e disk bit by bit and authenti ates the oheren e of
the image le against the original media by he king the hashing value to prove the eviden e was found
in a unmodi ed environment.
Currently SMART only support BeOS and Linux operating system. The support to other platforms
su h as Windows or Ma OS will be available next.

4.1.1 Core features of SMART
 Data A quisition (disk imaging, wiping and restoring)
 Data Authenti ation (hashing)
 Data Analysis (media Sear hing)
 Log and Report

4.2 EnCase
4.2.1 Core features of EnCase
 Multiple Sorting Fields, In luding Time Stamps
 Automated Sear h and Analysis of Zip Files and E-Mail Atta hments
 File Signature and Hash Library Support
 Es ript Ma ro Language
 Uni ode Support

4.3 Maresware
is Mares and Company's forensi s software produ t. \It provides an essential set of tools for investigating
omputer re ords and se uring private information."
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4.4 Law Enfor ement Software (LESS)
is the NTI's (New Te hnologies In .) forensi software produ t. It in ludes several forensi tools running
under Windows or DOS platform, whi h have spe ial forensi fun tionalities.
5

Forensi

spe ial purpose software

5.1 Forensi software for steganography
Steganography is the art of hiding information within information so as to not arouse suspi ion and
the pro ess of inje ting information into overt hannels so ass to on eal the information. It is an
e e tive tool for prote ting personal information, and organizations are spending a lot of energy and
time ain analysing steganography te hniques to prote t their integrity. However, steganography an also
be detrimental. It is hindering law enfor ement authorities in gathering eviden e to stop illegal a tivities,
be ause these te hniques of hiding information are be oming more sophisti ated.
Steganography hides the existen e of a message by transmitting information through various arriers.
Its goal is to prevent the dete tion of a se ret message. The most ommon use of steganography is
hiding information from one le within the information of another le. For example, over arriers, su h
as images, audio, video, text, or ode represented digitally, hold the hidden information. The hidden
information may be plaintext, ipher text, images, or information hidden in a bit stream.
As riminals be ome more aware of the apabilities of forensi examiners to re over omputer eviden e
they are making more use of en ryption te hnology su h as to on eal in riminating data. Online hild
pornographers use steganography te hnology to reate private ommuni ations and hide the les they
ex hanged into normal omputer les.
On the ontrary, the poli e an use the steganography te hnologies to obtain more eviden e. For
example, one appli ation o steganography is data stru ture enhan ement. The poli e ould use this
te hnology to enhan e the surveillant video pi tures in order to nd more details about the rime s ene
and suspe ts. They also an use atta k methods on steganography to nd the hidden rime eviden e.
The normal solution to dete t hidden information is to build a library of hash sets and ompare
them with hash values of les being investigated. The hash sets will identify steganography le mat hes.
Investigators must use safe hash sets to lter harmless les from their investigation. System les that
have not been modi ed sin e installation are in luded in a safe hash set. National Institute of Standards
and Te hnology (NIST)'s Information Te hnology Laboratory one ongoing omputer forensi s resear h
proje t alled National Software Referen e Library (NSRL), whi h try to ompute a unique identi er
for ea h le in the normal operating systems based on the le's ontents. These identi ers are reated
by SHA-1 hash algorithm. So if a perpetrator tries to hide a pornographi image by renaming it as a
nondes ript operating system le, .EXE, renaming a .JPG image as an .EXE le, The hash value derived
from the image will not mat h that from the known operating system le and will thus be un overed.

5.1.1 Forensi software for PDAs
Currently, most omputer forensi software produ ts are designed for desktop or laptop. However, Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) is now being widely used for business ommuni ation and personal mobile
omputing, whi h may also be involved in many riminal s enes. Thus, spe ial forensi software designed
to examine and identify omputer eviden e on PDA is needed.
Joseph Grand (Joseph), in his arti le \pdd: Memory Imaging and Forensi Analysis of Palm OS
Devi es" introdu es a Windows-based tool for memory imaging and forensi a quisition of data from the
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Palm operating system (OS) family o .pdd an preserve the rime s ene by obtaining a bit-for-bit image
or "snapshot" of the Palm devi e's memory ontents.
The data retrieved by pdd in ludes all user appli ations and databases (along with stray databases
that old appli ations left behind). This provides a signi ant amount of information for forensi analysis.
For example, re ords that have been marked for deletion by appli ations using the Palm APIDmDeleteRe ord fun tion (e.g., from the Address Book, Memo Pad, To Do Lisst, C allendar, et .( are
not a tually removed and will remain on the devi e until a su essful HotSyn operation to a desktop
ma hine. So the data an still be re overed before the HotSyn has taken pla e but after re ords have
been `deleted'.
6

Con lusion and Future Dire tions

Computer forensi s is used to identify eviden e when personal omputers are used in the ommission of
rimes or in the abuse of ompany poli ies. Eviden e is the foundation of every riminal ase, in luding
those involving omputer rimes. The olle tion and preservation of omputer eviden e di ers in many
ways from the methods law enfor ement oÆ ers are used to using for traditional types of eviden e.
The te hnology in omputer forensi led is hanging at an unpre edented rate and we an only
anti ipate that the task of the omputer forensi experts is going to be ome ever more hallenging. A
good grasp of the theoreti al and pra ti al prin iples of omputer and legal knowledge is an essential
prerequisite for the professional forensi analyst.
Computer forensi spe ialists guarantee a ura y of eviden e pro essing results through the use of
time-tested eviden e pro essing pro edures and through the use of multiple forensi software. The use of
di erent forensi software tools that have been developed independently to validate results is important
to avoid ina ura ies introdu ed by potential software design aws and software bugs.
Histori ally omputer forensi s was fo used on the imaging, analysis, and reporting of a stand- alone
personal omputer hard drive perhaps 1 GB in size using DOS-based tools. However, due to a number
of hanges and advan es in te hnology an evolution has begun in the eld of omputer forensi s.
The rst type of hange onsists of larger hard drives. It is now ommon for hard drives on personal
omputers to be 40-60GB in size. And, in the orporate environment, it is not un ommon to have
enterprise- lass servers ontaining multiple 80GB hard drives in ea h. There has also been a signi ant
in rease in the number o PCs, and a noteworthy rise in the use of PCs to ommit rimes or aid in riminal
a tivities. The se ond type of hange in ludes the popularity of non-PC devi es su h as handhelds, mobile
ellular telephones, digital ameras, servers, et . The third type of hange is the in rease in the number
of non-Windows operating systems, in luding both UNIX and Linus variants, Ma OS, BeOS, et .
In reasingly, forensi examiners are fa ed with analyzing `non-traditional' PCs, orporate se urity
professionals are doubling as in-house forensi examiners and in ident rst responders, and riti al data
is residing in volatile system memory.
Thomas Rude (Thomas), in his arti le \Next Generation Data Forensi s and Linux" de nes `Next
Generation Data Forensi s' as \The pro ess of imaging and analysing data stored in any ele troni format,
for the purpose of reporting ndings in a neutral manner, with no predisposition ass to guilt or inno en e."
So, what's next? New automated software into the omputer forensi s investigative pro ess will be
introdu ed, stable foundation built on s ienti rigor to support the introdu tion of eviden e and expert
testimony in ourt will be provided. In general, the new generation omputer forensi software will
support signi antly larger hard drivers, non-PC devi es su h as servers, handhelds, digital ameras, et .
and more non-Windows operating systems su h as Ma OS, AIX, and Solaris et
\Improve law enfor ement apa ity to fully engage with the s ienti ommunity. Appoint a high level
S ien e and Te hnology poli y group, underpinned by a s ien e and te hnology learing house. Identify
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me hanisms to en ourage Australian industry and resear h agen ies to parti ipate in the development
and produ tion of new, a ordable te hnologies for law enfor ement".
These are three re ommendations from Prime Minister's S ien e, Engineering and Innovation Coun il
(PMSEIC) for stakeholders of rime prevention and law enfor ement. Look ahead, omputer forensi
s ientists and forensi software developers still have a long way to go.
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